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The normative literature on fiscal federalism generally recognises the need for fiscal 
equalisation mechanisms to facilitate the mitigation of inequities in the distribution of 
resources. The question of how far to go in matters of fiscal equalisation is a very 
sensitive one. Choices in this area reflect the prevailing social norms and the political 
debates, in the context of which these norms are expressed. Moreover, the political 
debates are characterised by the usual tensions between selfish and altruistic visions of 
society. 
The empirical part of this contribution analyses the results of two referenda recently held 
in the Canton of Vaud in Switzerland. It provides explanatory models for both ballots 
(acceptance rate of the propositions in each municipality). The model’s explanatory 
variables show that the people of Vaud’s voting behaviour was basically selfish. The 
widespread belief that voters are capable of altruism in this particular area is, therefore, 
rejected. 
                                                      
*  We would like to thank Pascal van Griethuysen for his help in the initial stage of our analysis, Marc-
Jean Martin and Simon Iogna-Prat for their help in data analysis, and Yves Goël from the Cantonal 
Research and Statistical Information Service for providing the necessary data and statistics.  2
1 Introduction 
Thanks to the fiscal competition it generates, a certain degree of fiscal decentralisation is 
considered to be an efficiency factor. However, it is acknowledged that such competition 
is generally also a source of inequity. There are several factors at play here: the 
distribution of taxpayers' ability to pay leads to disparities in resources, and demographic, 
geographic, social, territorial and structural characteristics lead to disparities in needs and 
costs. Decentralised municipalities are, thus, obliged to apply different tax rates even 
when the services provided are the same in terms of quality. 
Faced with these inequities, legal and administrative frameworks have always been torn 
between two extreme courses of action: (a) eliminate the inequities by devising a system 
whereby the same tax rates are applied for public services of the same quality; (b) give 
free rein to competition between municipalities and accept the resulting increase in 
inequities. 
The normative literature considers that neither option is efficient and therefore recognises 
the need for a fiscal equalisation mechanism. However, it does not specify the degree of 
interventionism required. Thus, recommendation Rec(2000)14 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe mentions as a guideline that "a substantial degree of 
financial equalisation is a necessary condition of fiscal decentralisation and a strong local 
government". The recommendation adds that "fiscal equalisation mechanisms […] should 
be designed so that they can at least partially equalise the fiscal strength of 
municipalities". As these statements clearly indicate, the question as to how far to go in 
matters of fiscal equalisation is a very sensitive one. Choices in this area reflect the 
prevailing social norms and the political debates, in the context of which these norms are 
expressed. Moreover, the political debates are characterised by the usual tensions 
between selfish and altruistic visions of society. 
The aim of this article is to model the voting behaviour recorded when a fiscal 
equalisation issue is put to the people. This model should enable the isolation of the 
variables which influence the result of such a vote. It aims, in particular, to establish 
whether the voters’ behaviour qualifies as altruistic or whether it should be classified as 
the opposite, i.e. selfish behaviour. The latter is characterised in particular by a “vote with 
one’s wallet”, i.e. decisions based on the voters’ self-interest. 
We consider the hypothesis whereby voters’ reasoning is basically selfish. This 
hypothesis complies with the hypothesis presented by Meltzer and Richard (1983) who 
suggest that «rich-to-poor» redistribution is usually accepted by voters whose income is 
lower than average and tends to be rejected by voters with higher-than-average incomes.  
However, we believe that voting behaviour cannot be fully explained in terms of a selfish 
rationality. Individuals must give equal consideration in their reasoning to ethical, i.e. 
altruistic, concerns with regard to values of redistributive justice and solidarity. Thus, the  3
two dimensions  – selfishness and altruism – are linked in determining the actual 
outcome of the poll. 
The hypotheses are tested using the results of two referenda held at a year’s interval in 
the Swiss Canton of Vaud. In both cases, the ballot concerned the introduction of a new 
tax equalisation mechanism in the Canton’s municipalities. In May 2000, the Canton’s 
inhabitants voted in favour of a project proposed by the government and the Union of 
Vaud Municipalities (Union des communes vaudoises). The project in question can be 
described as minimalist. In June 2001, the same people rejected an initiative proposed by 
an extreme left-wing party, the Workers’ Party (POP, i.e. parti ouvrier populaire). This 
project was far too ambitious as it proposed that the fiscal burden associated with the tax 
on the income of natural persons be made identical for all the municipalities in the Canton 
(i.e. full tax harmonisation). 
  4
2 The theoretical framework:  
altruism and voting on mechanisms of 
tax equalisation 
Decentralised systems are credited with offering several advantages: e.g. the possibility 
of tailoring outputs to local tastes, the fostering of intergovernmental competition and the 
promotion of experimentation in locally provided goods and services. However, such 
systems have also disadvantages, including externalities, failure to exploit scale 
economies in the provision of public goods and tax collection, and inefficient tax systems. 
In addition to these disadvantages, decentralised systems also raise an equity issue. 
When the barriers to movement are low, it can be expected that an individual’s choice of 
location will be influenced by the package of tax services provided by the various 
jurisdictions. In terms of equality, the consequences of this phenomenon are 
problematical. In effect, all municipalities are not equally equipped to cope with the 
competition. Different jurisdictions have different demographic, geographic, social, 
territorial and structural characteristics which lead to disparities in their needs and costs. 
The unequal distribution of the taxpayers' ability to pay among the different jurisdictions 
leads to disparities in resources. If measures are not taken, the gap between well-off low-
tax jurisdictions and badly-off high-tax jurisdictions inevitably widens.  
Fiscal equalisation mechanisms are probably the main solution available for bridging this 
gap, or at least preventing it from widening further. However, when the question of 
introducing a new system or modifying an existing one arises, the degree of equalisation 
is the key issue. A wide variety of solutions may be envisaged in the ensuing political 
debate, ranging between (a) the complete eradication of the gap between rich 
jurisdictions and poor jurisdictions, and (b) allowing the gap to evolve on the basis of the 
competition between jurisdictions. 
The notion of solidarity, i.e. redistributive justice, is very prevalent in the political debates 
surrounding the introduction of equalisation mechanisms. As a result, these discourses 
carry an altruistic value. In standard usage, the term altruism denotes an unselfish 
interest in the welfare of others. In economics, an actor is altruistic if his/her utility is 
positively linked with the utility of other actors (Jarret, 1998). This value is the opposite of 
the paradigm of the selfish or selfish actor, according to which the economic (and 
political) actor aims exclusively to maximise his/her personal well-being or utility. 
Beyond the empathy discourse, the actual impact of altruistic sentiments at the time of 
decision-making is questionable, irrespective of whether the decision is taken within a 
direct democratic system or in the context of representative democracy. In other words, 
do elected representatives or citizens act altruistically or selfishly when they have to vote 
in favour of or against a new equalisation mechanism (or a better equalisation 
mechanism). Meltzer and Richard (1983) have tested the hypothesis of selfish behaviour 
and show that a redistribution of wealth to the poor is only supported by persons (voters)  5
whose own income is below average; persons whose income is above average tend to 
oppose such measures. Thus, the result of a vote on an equalisation mechanism 
depends on selfish interests and on whether the average voter belongs to the group of 
contributors (rich) or beneficiaries (poor). 
However, Goodin and Roberts (1975), Margolis (1982), Mueller (1989) and again 
Zamagni (1995) all demonstrated the existence of a tension between selfish and ethical 
considerations. These authors do not reject the existence of altruism in the objective 
function of the vote. As a result, they relativise the notion of purely selfish behaviour in 
the context of collective decisions. Thus, Margolis suggests that “… we have good 
reason to expect that a viable formal theory of politics will need to extend the traditional 
model of rational choice in at least three ways: provision of a central role for public goods; 
explicit treatment of altruistic motivation; and explicit treatment of the role of persuasion.” 
Furthermore, voting is generally associated with the spirit of civic duty, despite the fact, 
as suggested by Goodin and Roberts1, there is a greater chance of being killed on the 
way to the polling station than of being able to change or influence the result of the ballot. 
Thus, they insist on the fact that individuals have selfish and ethical preferences and that 
their welfare functions include both ethical and selfish components, even if the latter 
usually take precedence over the former. This hypothesis is formalised by Mueller (1989) 
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where Oi  represents the objective function of the individual i. The function includes the 
utility of the object of the vote for the individual Ui and the sum of the utility for the other 
members j of the society Uj. The parameter θ expresses the more or less altruistic 
behaviour of the voter. The hypothesis, according to which the voter would take into 
account the utility of others, or the entire society, in his/her decision, implies that 
0 < θ < 1.  θ  would not, however, assume extreme values. Firstly, entirely selfish 
behaviour (θ = 0) is excluded in accordance with the hypothesis of Margolis, Goodin, 
Roberts, Zamagni and Mueller. Secondly, a strictly altruistic attitude (θ = 1) would be 
incompatible with the Meltzer and Richard’s paradigm of the selfish actor (the utility of the 
individual  Ui  being merely a marginal factor in the decision). Thus, the value of the 
parameter  θ represents the voter’s trade-off between his/her personal interests 
(selfishness) and his/her interest in the social welfare (altruism). From an empirical 
perspective, the entire question lies in the estimation of the parameter θ. 
According to Hudson and Jones (1994) there is “significant support to the concept of an 
ethical voter put forward by Mueller, confirming that perceptions of the public interest 
                                                      
1 «No rational egoist should bother voting because, as Skinner’s Dr. Frazier notes, the probability of any 
one man casting the decisive vote «is less than the chance he will be killed on the way to the polls».»  6
have considerable influence in determining policy preferences”.  Their contribution 
presents a new approach in terms of the estimation of altruism and its effect on voters’ 
preferences. With the aim of demonstrating the levels of selfishness or altruism shown by 
citizens, they carried out an empirical study among two samples comprising 466 and 345 
people living in the English city of Bath using questions on current issues associated with 
government activity. The study ultimately showed that the level of education and income 
are important determining factors when it comes to altruism. This challenges the belief 
which was hitherto firmly established in the public choice literature that individual 
behaviour is solely motivated by selfish considerations.  
Table 1 illustrates Mueller’s model, according to which the voter (elected representative 
or citizen) either contributes to or benefits from the equalisation mechanism. If the voter 
contributes, his/her own utility Ui will definitely diminish (descending arrow); in contrast, 
the way in which the collective utility  Uj  evolves is ignored (bi-directional arrow). 
According to the traditional hypothesis of individual rationality, the outcome of the vote 
will be positive if the loss in utility is compensated by a gain in the collective utility2. 
Conversely, if the voter is a beneficiary of the mechanism, his own utility Ui will certainly 
increase (ascending arrow); however, this also completely ignores the evolution of the 
collective utility Uj (arrow once again bi-directional). The outcome of the vote will be 
positive if the gain in individual utility is not made at the cost of an equal or greater loss in 
the collective utility. 
Thus, irrespective of the voter is a contributor or beneficiary, the rule for voter decision-
making  can be expressed as follows…  
positive vote if   0 U θ U
j i
j i > + ∑
≠
,  
negative vote if   0 U θ U
j i




THE EVOLUTION OF UTILITY ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE EQUALISATION MECHANISM 












                                                      
2   The individual rationality hypothesis must not, of course, be confused with the selfishness hypothesis.  7
 
In the case of the secret ballot, it is not possible to observe the individual voter 
behaviour3. Thus, in this case, it is necessary to avail of other means to establish 
whether altruistic motivations influence voters in their decisions. This case is covered by 
the work of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975), who 
recorded the characteristics and opinions of individual voters on the basis of an analysis 
of questionnaires distributed among voters in the United States during presidential 
elections. For example, Ashenfelter and Kelley established that the sense of civic duty is 
the primary motivation among voters; this is followed by a number of other variables such 
as education and variables connected with the sense of obligation to vote. In Switzerland, 
the VOX analyses provide insight into voter motivation. These are exit polls carried out 
during federal referenda which record information on voting and the individual 
characteristics of voters. However, these analyses do not reveal anything on the 
motivation of voters; at best they facilitate the demographic and sociological classification 
of the referenda results.  
                                                      
3  The behaviour of individuals is observable in the case of nominal voting or votes based on a show of 
hands.  8
3 Empirical evidence 
3.1  The projects in the Swiss Canton of Vaud 
Two referenda on equalisation mechanisms were recently held in the Swiss Canton of 
Vaud; the two referenda took the form of a secret ballot. Both of the proposed projects 
aimed to reduce the financial inequalities which exist among the Canton’s municipalities. 
It should be noted that in each of Vaud’s municipalities, the tax rate levied on the income 
of natural persons is defined on the basis of a reference tax structure. This tax structure 
is applied in all of the municipalities. Each municipality sets a multiplier coefficient of the 
tax rates included in the reference tax structure. Thus, in the year 2000, the municipality 
with the Canton’s lowest fiscal burden set a coefficient of 40 (40%), while the municipality 
with the highest fiscal burden set a coefficient of 135 (135%). Therefore, by choosing to 
reside in one municipality area rather than another, a tax payer end up paying over three 
times more tax. 
In 2000, the Council of State (Conseil d’ État, i.e. the cantonal executive body) and the 
Union of Vaud Municipalities (Union des communes vaudoises, i.e. UCV) proposed an 
‘official’ project aimed at creating a horizontal equalisation fund between municipalities. 
The objective was to eventually reduce the coefficients applied by 90% of the 
municipalities to a range of between 70 and 110 (i.e. between 70% and 110%). Each 
municipality would pay a contribution to the fund corresponding to the sum represented 
by 13 coefficient points. Thus, the fiscally strong municipalities would contribute more 
than the financially weaker ones. The fund would then be redistributed among the 
municipalities on the basis of three criteria: fiscal strength, fiscal burden and 
demographics. The project was ratified by a majority of 63.46% in a referendum held in 
the Canton in May 2000. 
Deeming the mechanism’s objective as inadequate, the Worker’s Party (POP) – an 
extreme left-wing party – then launched a popular initiative aimed at the introduction of a 
single coefficient for all of the municipalities. This coefficient was to be set at around 92 
(92%) at the introduction of the mechanism and more or less corresponds to the average 
of the coefficients in force in 2000 weighted by the population levels in each municipality 
area. Under the mechanism proposed by the POP, all of the local-authority tax revenue 
would be combined and redistributed among the municipalities, more or less on the basis 
of the number of inhabitants in each authority area. The project’s initiators predicted a 
decrease in taxes for 2/3 of taxpayers with a simultaneous increase in revenue for 2/3 of 
the municipalities and no major variation in the total local-authority tax revenue for the 
Canton. The 12,000 signatures necessary to launch the initiative were collected and the 
proposal was put to the people in a referendum in June 2001. It was rejected by a 
majority of 68.5%  9
After this, the Green Party launched its equalisation proposition which stipulates that the 
home municipality shall directly benefit from tax revenue based on the first CHF 250, 000 
of taxable income of the natural persons resident in its jurisdiction. With respect to wealth 
tax, a ceiling would be set at the first five million CHF. In cases, in which the taxable 
income or taxable wealth of certain residents exceed these sums, the tax revenue 
collected on the excess would be used to fund an equalisation mechanism. Thus, 
according to the initiative, this would make it possible for «all municipalities to benefit 
from providential taxpayers». The Greens publicised their proposition prior to the 
referendum on the POP project. Thus, it was presented de facto as a counter-project to 
the POP initiative. 
 
3.2  Modelled results 
The results of the referenda on these two projects – the ‘official’ project (proposed by the 
Council of State and the UCV) and the POP project – is now known. The two referenda 
took the form of secret ballots. Thus, there is no information available about individual 
voters. However, the individual acceptance rates for each of the Canton’s 384 
municipalities are available. 
Thus, it is possible to carry out an initial categorisation of the municipalities for the 
purpose of identifying those in which the average voter’s behaviour was altruistic and the 
municipalities in which the average voter’s behaviour was selfish. 
¾ A municipality can be described as altruistic in the following two cases: 
¾ if the proposition – either the official or the POP proposition – yielded an 
acceptance rate that is greater than or equal to 50%, although it involves an 
increase in the tax coefficient for the municipality. In effect, as  0 < i U , it is 
essential that  0 U j ∑ >  and that the value of θ  be high enough for 
0 U θ U j i ∑ > +  (condition for a positive ballot). The higher the acceptance level, 
the more altruistic the municipality, the variation in tax coefficient being equal 
(Quadrant I, Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
¾ if the proposition yielded an acceptance rate that is lower than 50%, although it 
involves a reduction in the coefficient. The lower the acceptance rate, the more 
altruistic the municipality, the variation in tax coefficient being equal. In effect, as 
0 > i U , it is essential that  0 U j ∑ <  and that the value of θ  is high enough for 
0 U θ U j i ∑ < +  (condition for a negative ballot). It should be noted, however, that 
this type of altruistic behaviour is related to ‘financial masochism’ as municipalities 
in question generally have financial difficulties (Quadrant III). 
¾ A municipality can be described as selfish in the following two cases:  10
¾ if the proposition yielded an acceptance rate that is greater than or equal to 50%, 
although it involves a reduction in the tax coefficient for the municipality. In effect, 
as  0 > i U , if ∑ < 0 j U , the value of θ  must be low enough for   0 U θ U j i ∑ > +  
(condition for a positive outcome). Thus, the higher the acceptance rate, the more 
selfish the municipality, the variation in tax coefficient being equal (Quadrant IV). 
¾ if the proposition yielded an acceptance rate that is lower than 50%, although it 
involves an increase in the coefficient. In effect, as  0 < i U , if ∑ > 0 j U , the value 
of  θ  must be low enough for  0 U θ U j i ∑ < +  (condition for a negative outcome). 
Thus the lower the acceptance rate, the more selfish the municipality, the variation 
in tax coefficient being equal (Quadrant II). 
When linked with the expected evolution of the tax coefficient, the acceptance rate 
constitutes a priori the only element which enables the identification of altruistic or selfish 
behaviour in the context of a secret ballot. This is presented in graphical form in Figure 1, 
which is based on the result of the referendum on the ‘official vote’, and in Figure 2, 
which presents the data on the result of the referendum on the POP project. The x-axis 
expresses the rate of acceptance from 0% to 100%. The y-axis shows the increase (in 
relative terms) of the tax coefficient – from origin upwards – and reduction (in relative 
terms) of the tax coefficient – from origin downwards. The figures are divided into four 
quadrants, each of which presents a different behaviour in accordance with the typology 
described above. 
In terms of the ‘official’ project, Figure 1 shows that the majority of the municipalities in 
the Canton of Vaud voted selfishly (Quadrants II and IV). Behaviour differed only in a few 
municipalities and these are shown in Quadrants I and III4. It should also be noted that 
the six municipalities which feature in the third quadrant could also be classified as 
‘masochistic’ as they rejected a reduction in their tax coefficient. 
Figure 2 shows that the outcome of the referendum on the POP project was significantly 
different. In this case, a significant number of municipalities are located in the third 
quadrant. These are the municipalities which rejected the project even though it would 
have meant a reduction in their tax coefficient. Again, the term ‘altruistic and masochistic’ 
municipalities is applicable here. These municipalities include the majority of the 
municipalities which had previously accepted the ‘official’ project and which, therefore, 
figured in Quadrant IV of Figure 1. Quadrant I in Figure 2 includes fewer municipalities 
than the corresponding quadrant in Figure 1. Only eight municipalities accepted the POP 
initiative although it would have meant an increase in their tax coefficient5. 
                                                      
4   The municipalities in question are: Le Vaud, Montchérand, Corbeyrier, St-Georges, Bretonnières and St-
Livres in quadrant III and Sévery et Rovray for the extremities of quadrant I. 
5 The municipalities in question are: Vaulion, Vaugondry, Romairon, Provence, Chessel, Oleyres, 
Mauborget and Seigneux.  11
The number of municipalities located on the right-hand side of Figure 1 exceeds the 
number of municipalities which feature on the left-hand side of the same graphic. Thus, 
the majority of municipalities accepted the ‘official’  project. The distribution of the 
population among these municipalities does not challenge this phenomenon as the 
project gained the majority of the votes cast. Conversely, in Figure 2 the vast majority of 
municipalities are located on the left-hand side. Thus, the majority of municipalities 
rejected the POP project. The population distribution between the municipalities does not 
have any affect on the outcome. 
The two figures demonstrate the existence of a relationship between acceptance rate and 
fiscal pressure: in both cases, the lower the increase in the coefficient or the greater the 
reduction in the coefficient, the higher the acceptance rate. This is indicative of 
selfishness. However, this selfishness is less marked in the graphical representation of 
the result of the referendum on the POP project (Figure 2). This is due to the paradox 
whereby the acceptance rate in the municipalities to which the initiative promised a 
reduction in the coefficient was less than 50%. This acceptance rate was, however, 
higher than that in the municipalities which would have had an increase in their 
coefficient. Thus, significant variations can be observed in the voting behaviour in the 
referenda on the ‘official’ and POP projects.  12
FIGURE 1 
POSITIONING OF THE MUNICIPALITIES ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF ALTRUISM OR SELFISHNESS 
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4 Econometric explanation of the voting 
In graphically demonstrating a strong correlation between the acceptance rate and the 
variation of the tax coefficient, the above figures show that the variable ‘tax coefficient 
variation’ plays a decisive role in the average voter’s objective function. If this is true, it is 
possible to deduce that the implicit value of θ  is low. Failing the ability to estimate this 
value, it is at least possible to provide a clearer outline of the selfish behaviour of voters. 
To do this, the influence of variable ‘tax coefficient variation’ may be quantified in the 
explanation of the variation of the acceptance rate. It is also possible to try to 
demonstrate the influence of other variables which are indicative of selfish or altruistic 
behaviour. By trying to explain these rates using independent variables, we return to an 
approximation of Mueller’s model. Thus, the meaning of the relationship with the 
independent variable provides information about the voting behaviour.  
 
4.1  Estimation of the econometric models 
As demonstrated above, there is a perceptible difference in the voting behaviour with 
respect to the ‘official’ project and the POP project. In an attempt to reach a better 
understanding of this difference, we use a transformation to model the relationship 
between the acceptance rate in each municipality and the explanatory variables. This 
transformation, proposed by Box and Cox (1964), enables the adaptation of the form of 
this relationship to the results.  
As a result, the municipalities’ acceptance rates (AR) are transformed according to the 
formula  
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
1
2 1 λ λ
λ λ − + = AR AR   
where λ1 is a Box-Cox parameter determined to normalise the error distribution and 
allows a great deal of flexibility in the search for an appropriate functional form. It is 
possible for the transformation to be linear (λ1=1) or a natural logarithm (λ1=0). A second 
Box-Cox parameter, λ2, has to be introduced in cases where the acceptance rate equals 
zero. The search for the values of both Box-Cox parameters that maximised the 
likelihood function requires a complex procedure. A value of 1 for λ2 is therefore 
arbitrarily added to the acceptance rate (Mitchell and Carson, 1989, p. 372).  
Table 2 shows the results of the modelling of the ballots on the ‘official’ project (model 1) 
and the POP project (models 2 and 3). In all cases, the dependent variable is each 
municipalities’ acceptance rate for the project under consideration. Several explanatory 
variables were tested. Only the significant enough ones are used in the models 
presented here. These models have been estimated with the help of 384 observations. 
Each observation corresponds to a Vaud municipality.  14
TABLE 2 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE ‘OFFICIAL’ AND POP PROJECTSa 
Independent variable  ‘Official’ 
project  POP project 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 






Variation of the tax coefficient, numerical variable indicating 
the variation of the local-authority tax coefficient before and after the 







Gross debt, numerical variable indicating the gross local-authority 







Cash flow, numerical variable indicating the cash flow (current 








Political leanings, numerical variable which reflects the 
municipality’s political leanings, varying from 1.0 for totally left-wing 







n  384 384  384 
λ1  1.26 1.26  0.33 
Lmax  –1510.18 –1567.27  –1470.11 
Pseudo R 2  0.73 0.36  0.46 
 
a.  The numbers shown in brackets beneath the estimated parameters represent the values of 
∧
t . The 
coefficients marked with a double asterisk are significant at a level of 99%; those with a single asterisk 
are significant at 95% (two-sided test). 
 
The specification given to the model of the voting behaviour on the ‘official’ project by the 
Box-Cox transformation is relatively close to a linear formulation, since λ1 is quite close 
to one (1.26). Indeed, according to the maximum likelihood function, the parameter λ1 
lies with a 95% probability within the range 1.08 < λ1 <1.44. Thus, the unit value (1) is 
almost included in the confidence interval for λ1. 
Some independent variables prove to be negatively correlated with the acceptance rate. 
As already demonstrated in graphical form, this is the case for the variation of the local-
authority tax coefficient (quantified in percent). Similarly, the higher the level of the 
municipality debt or cash flow per inhabitant, the higher the acceptance rate. The fact that 
there is a positive correlation between cash flow and the acceptance rate goes against 
the selfishness hypothesis. Conversely, however, the relationship with debt or the tax 
coefficient conforms to this hypothesis. It should, however, be noted that cash flow can 
vary significantly from one year to the next. Thus, this variable would reflect the recent 
evolution of the municipality’s financial situation, while the debt reflects a more historical 
account of its financial strength or weakness. Hence, it would be dangerous to deduce 
from this that the financial ease offered by a sizeable cash flow promotes altruism while 
the existence of a sizeable debt would tend to lead to greater selfishness. The model also  15
includes a variable based on the municipality’s political leanings. This information is 
derived from the voting percentages obtained by each political party in the municipality 
during the federal elections of 1999. It also takes each party’s ideological discourse 
(more or less left, more or less right) into account. The value for each municipality is 
given in the form of an index which combines each party’s power base and political 
ideology6. The lower the value of this variable, i.e. the closer to 1.0, the more left-wing 
the municipality. The higher the value, i.e. the closer to 8.2, the more right-wing the 
municipality. The acceptance rate is negatively correlated with political leanings: the more 
right-wing a municipality’s leanings, the lower the acceptance rate. For almost each 
variable, except the variable based on the municipality’s political leanings, the 
significance level is higher than 95%. As anticipated, it is particularly high in the case of 
the tax coefficient variation. 
The same functional form, i.e. using a λ1 of 1.26, was used to model the result of the 
referendum on the POP project (Model 2). According to the hypothesis, whereby the 
voting behaviour should have been identical for the two projects, the estimated 
coefficients should be relatively stable. This is not, however, the case, even if the sign of 
the relationship remains the same, with the exception of the cash flow variable. As a 
result and contrary to the previous model, the relationship with the cashflow also 
conforms to a selfish logic. 
Even if this model offers a high level of significance for all the variables, it does not 
maximise the likelihood. For the likelihood to be maximised, one must relax the constraint 
over  λ1. Thus, λ1 assumes the value 0.33, i.e. the functional form tends towards 
logarithmicity (Model 3). However, the null value (0) lies far enough from the confidence 
interval, since according to the maximum likelihood function, the parameter λ1 lies with à 
95% probability within the range 0.23 < λ1 < 0.45. Even if the sign of the relationship 
remains the same than in model 2, the DEBT variable loses in significance. 
In the two models for the POP project referendum, the degree of significance of the 
variation of the tax coefficient is lower than it is in the model for the ‘official’ project 
referendum. Conversely, the degree of significance of the political leanings is perceptibly 
higher in Models 2 and 3. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the model for the 
‘official’ project referendum is significantly higher than that of Models 2 and 3 (73% as 
opposed to 36% for model 2 and 46% for model 3). 
The variations in the significance of the variables in the different models, the shift from a 
positive correlation to a negative correlation with the cashflow and the large difference in 
the explanatory capacity and in the functional form show that the voting behaviour in the 
two objects was different. 
Table 3 presents the matrix of simple correlation coefficients that exist between the 
different model variables for the two objects voted on. The coefficients shown in brackets 
correspond to the POP project (Model 3) and the others correspond to the official project 
                                                      
6  Index proposed by Lane and Ersson (1994), based on the considerations of Ladner and Brändle 
(1997) and presented in Ladner (1999 : 221).  16
(Model 1). This table enables the comparison of the influence of different variables on the 
acceptance rate. 
It is possible to observe differences between the two coefficients. These differences are 
associated with the fact that the two projects involve a variation in the tax coefficient and 
different acceptance rates. With respect to the variables [DEBT] and [CASHFLOW], 
these differences originate from the fact that the values used in the «official» model are 
based on figures from 1998, and those used in the POP model are based on figures from 
1999. The variable [POLITICS], which expresses the political trend, is based on the 
results of the 1999 federal elections. As a result, its value for each municipality is 
identical for both models. Thus, the difference between the coefficients arises from the 
fact that the two projects have a different acceptance rate. 
Irrespective of the project (‘official’ or POP), the variation with respect to the municipality 
tax coefficient [COEFFICIENT] is the variable with the highest coefficient of correlation 
(-0.85 and -0.60). In the case of the ‘official’ project, this is followed by the municipality’s 
debt per inhabitant [DEBT], cash flow per inhabitant [CASHFLOW] and, finally, political 
leanings [POLITICS]. On the other hand, in the case of the POP project, these two last 
variables play a more prominent role –  even more prominent than DEBT. The fact that 
the POLITICS variable assumes such importance here (–0.27) is indicative of the 
widespread politicisation of the debate and the existence of significant political division.  
Table 3 also enables the evaluation of the possible co-linearity between the explanatory 
variables. The simple correlation coefficients do not reach critical levels even between 
the CASHFLOW and DEBT variables.  
 
TABLE 3  




COEFFICIENT DEBT  CASHFLOW  POLITICS 
ACCEPTANCE  1.000 -0.851  0.150  0.004  0.002 
  (1.000) (-0.604)  (0.208)  (–0.233) (–0.272) 
COEFFICIENT   1.000  -0.080  –0.030  -0.051 
    (1.000) (-0.165) (0.059) (0.032) 
DEBT     1.000  –0.213  –0.071 
     (1.000)  (–.054)  (–0.067) 
CASHFLOW       1.000  0.205 
       (1.000)  (0.085) 
POLITICS         1.000 




4.2  Could the result of the ballot on the POP 
project have been predicted? 
In view of the fact that the two polls took place at a year’s interval, the question arises as 
to whether the model based on the result of the first referendum on the ‘official’  project 
could have been used to predict the outcome of the vote on the POP project. The error 
this would have given rise to can also be examined.  
This question can be investigated by means of simulation. Our simulation is based on the 
estimated model for the ‘official’ project (Model 1). It refers to the uniform tax coefficient 
of 92 which was to have been applied at the introduction of the POP equalisation 
mechanism. The tax variation for each municipality corresponds, therefore, to the 
variation in percentages between the municipality coefficient for 1999 and the 92 
coefficient. The other variables do not change. In other words, the influence of 
determinants linked with the municipality debt per inhabitant, the margin of cashflow per 
inhabitant and the municipality’s political leanings remain identical to the situation as it 
stood in the year 2000. The simulation gives an acceptance rate of the POP project of 
64.9%.  
The prediction error is significant given that the initiative was rejected by more than two 
thirds of the voters (68.5% no vote), which implies an actual acceptance rate of 31.5%. 
How can this difference be explained? The statistical results show that there is little 
likelihood of a significant bias in the estimation of the model of the ‘official’ vote.  
We believe that the more likely explanation is the nature of the two objects subject to the 
vote. A priori, these two objects may seem similar: two fiscal equalisation projects, each 
resulting in a larger or smaller reduction or increase in the fiscal burden. 
However, these two objects were not voted on simultaneously but at an interval of one 
year (May 2000, June 2001). As a result, the attitudes of voters may have changed on 
the basis of the evolution of the framework conditions. Apart from a change in attitude, 
other elements which are intrinsic to the projects but which cannot be modelled most 
certainly played a role here. 
Even if the POP initiative was presented as a reaction to the lack of equalising ambition 
in the ‘official’ project (at least in the eyes of the initiators), the ‘official’ project was 
probably perceived de facto by voters as a counter-project to the initiative7. Previous 
experience in Switzerland has shown that, faced with a counter-project originating from 
an executive body, an initiative has little chance of being accepted. The chances were 
certainly further reduced by the fact that the ‘counter-project’ had already been accepted 
by the people prior to the vote on the initiative. 
                                                      
7   The Greens’ proposition/proposal is another implicit counter-project although it was not the subject of 
an initiative.  18
Furthermore, issues concerning identity and politics most certainly represented a further 
obstacle during the vote on the POP project. With respect to identity, in their efforts to 
militate in favour of a rejection of the POP initiative, several opinion leaders drew 
attention to the principle of local-authority autonomy. They emphasised the fact that the 
single rate proposed by the initiative would challenge the principle of identity among the 
users and payers of municipality services. This message was conveyed by the majority of 
the mayors, who, it must be noted, play a prominent role in the Canton’s public life. Fear 
of centralisation and distrust of cantonal authority were added to the identity issue. Thus, 
some dismissed the possibility of entrusting the management of municipal affairs to a 
Canton which has been in very bad financial straits for several years while the financial 
status of its municipalities is generally healthy.  
The strong influence of the POLITICS variable in the models of the vote on the POP 
project (and its higher level of significance vis à vis the model of the vote on the ‘official’ 
project) demonstrates the politicisation of the debate. This is also indicated by the 
reduction in the influence of the tax coefficient variant in this case: i.e. the voters 
relinquish a part of their (selfish) rationality and in some cases display ‘fiscal 
masochism’8. Under these conditions, a proposition originating from an extremist 
left-wing party has little chance of success among the electorate of a Canton whose 
political centre of gravity is on the right of the spectrum. 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
The analysis gives a paradoxical result which is, however, expected. The paradox arises 
from the fact that a fiscal equalisation system based on a principle of altruism is 
evaluated on the basis of a selfish rationality when put to a popular vote. Thus, the voters 
of Vaud came out more strongly in favour of the proposed system when it would enable a 
reduction in the fiscal burden. Conversely, they expressed greater opposition when faced 
with an expected rise in the fiscal burden. This effect was anticipated and has been 
verified.  
Thus, Melzer and Richard’s hypothesis (1983) is verified in the case of the ‘official’ 
project. The average voter belongs to the group of taxpayers who live in a municipality in 
which the introduction of the measure meant a reduction in the fiscal burden.  
                                                      
8   The opponents of the POP initiative claimed that the single tax rate would ultimately have exceeded 
the predicted 92% if the lack of corresponcence between the decision-makers and contributors were 
taken into account. If this is true, the number of beneficiaries of a reduction in taxes would have been 
lower than that stated by the POP.  
  It is interesting to note, however, that during the campaign for the ‘official’ project, information was 
provided on the municipalities in which fiscal pressure would be reduced and those in which fiscal 
pressure would increase as a result of the implementation of the project. This phenomenon did not 
really materialise in the interval between the two ballots and this may have contributed to an increase 
in the voters’ distrust with respect to the promises made in relation to the POP project.  19
The initiators of the POP project also counted on selfish behaviour on the part of the 
voters. Our simulations show that had the voters had adopted the same behaviour with 
respect to the POP project as they did for the ‘official’ project, the full tax harmonisation 
mechanism would have been generally accepted. There can be no doubt that selfish 
behaviour was at work here but in a much more diffuse way than was the case in the 
ballot on the ‘official’ project. Other factors also influenced the outcome, however: identity 
factors linked with questions of municipality autonomy, distrust of the cantonal authorities, 
political factors connected with a strongly politicised vote and the low level of acceptance 
for a proposition emanating from the extreme left. This led to the rejection of the project 
by numerous voters although, in theory at least, this project could have brought them a 
reduction in taxes. This shows an altruism towards those taxpayers who would have 
been subject to an increase in taxes. To put it more trivially, this behaviour has certain 
similarities to ‘fiscal masochism’. 
In conclusion, the example of the Vaud ballots on the fiscal equalisation projects show 
that it is possible to design a project in such a way that it is acceptable to the people if 
two principles are kept in mind. According to the first principle, voting behaviour is 
characterised by a strong level of selfishness and the altruistic dimension is weak or 
marginal. According to the second, the average voter should personally benefit from the 
project. As demonstrated by the failure of the POP project, which respected the first two 
principles, there is, however, a third principle which must also be taken into account: the 
proposition must originate from an official and politically majoritarian milieu. 
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